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Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Feminist Examination of
the Trend to Eliminate Women's Rights
During Pregnancy
Nora Christie Sandstadt
"If the fetus is a person, there are no limits on the state's
power to police and punish pregnant women ..
Introduction
While pregnant, a woman is no longer entitled to the full
scope of rights she held before her pregnancy. Two years ago,
Maryland forced a woman to give birth in her jail cell after an
inconsistent sentence; 2 unlike the standard practice of release, she
received a jail sentence because she was pregnant. 3 Some states
commit pregnant women against their will for consuming alcohol
while pregnant. 4 Upon suspicion of maternal substance abuse, the
government often removes children from their mother's custody at
birth. 5 As states and the federal government have expanded the
t. J.D. expected 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001,
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abilities of Mary Patricia Byrn, Molly Given, Steve Barrows, and the staff of Law
and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice. Special thanks to my family and
friends for their wisdom and support, especially Nathan LaCoursiere, Christie
Sandstad, Douglas Sandstad, and Tundra Sandstad.
1. Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishment and Prejudice: Judging Drug-Using
Pregnant Women, in MOTHER TROUBLES, RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL
DILEMMAS 59, 76 (Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick eds., 1999), available at
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/punishment%20and%20prejudice-
Final.pdf.
2. Julie B. Ehrlich & Lynn Paltrow, Jailing Pregnant Women Raises Health
Risks, WOMEN'S ENEWS, Sept. 20, 2006, www.womensenews.org/
article.cfmldyriaid/2894 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (describing Kari Parson's
delivery at the Jennifer Road Detention Center).
3. Id. ("Though standard practice is to release people arrested for probation
violations on their own recognizance until their later court dates, the judge in
Parsons' case sent her to jail, citing his interest in protecting the fetus's health.").
4. David C. Brody & Heidee McMillin, Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and
Governmental Foolhardiness Through Collaborative Linkages, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 249 (2001) (noting that Minnesota, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin permit this practice).
5. Id. at 250.
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rights of fetuses, the number of pregnant women being held in
jails and in hospitals because of their actions during pregnancy
has also increased. 6 Women's constitutional rights are violated
when the justice system treats women unequally due to their
condition of being pregnant. 7
The legal precedent in the United States regarding maternal
rights and fetal rights creates a legal riddle, from Roe v. Wade's
grant of privacy rights to women in their health care decisions s
and denial of Fourteenth Amendment personhood to fetuses, 9 to
the 2004 Unborn Victims of Violence Act's ("UVVA") grant of
federal personhood to fetuses. 10 If a fetus has rights, and its
rights are violated, can the violator be prosecuted differently
depending upon her relation to the fetus?" One thing is clear:
the recent trend to increase fetal rights through both judicial and
legislative actions is prompting a reduction in women's rights. 12
6. Id. at 244 (noting the increase in prosecutions of pregnant women).
7. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant
Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 688-89 (2006) ("Legal recognition of fetuses as persons
whose rights have been violated . . .reflects and reifies a particular conception of
pregnant women and their relationship to the developing fetus. This, in turn,
necessarily structures relations between pregnant women and the state. More
precisely, recognition of fetal victimhood has dictated heightened governmental
control over women's bodies and lives."); see also Paltrow, supra note 1, at 20 ('The
possibilities for denying women's freedom are not the fantasies of lawyers engaged
in slippery slope arguments, but rather current trends in the ever increasing effort
to win legal recognition of the fetus and to undermine and ultimately abolish
women's rights.").
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[T]he court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution.").
9. Id. at 158 ("All this ... persuades us that the word 'person' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
10. Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA), 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) ("[The
term 'unborn child' means a child in utero, and the term 'child in utero'. . . means a
member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in
the womb.").
11. See id. (excepting the mother as a potential violator under the law).
12. See Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 243-44 ("Over the last decade,
states have increasingly prosecuted women for using drugs or alcohol while
pregnant and modified their civil child abuse and neglect statutes to foster the civil
commitment of mothers and the removal of children in their care."); see also
Elizabeth Spiezer, Recent Developments in Reproductive Health Law and the
Constitutional Rights of Women: The Role of the Judiciary in Regulating Maternal
Health and Safety, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 526 (2005) ("Defining a fetus at any
stage of development as a 'human being' and declaring its termination as homicide
or child abuse is not a truthful or effective means of curtailing violence against
women or protecting children. Rather, such statutes create a false definition of a
woman's pregnancy and place her in a role as secondarily important as compared
with the importance of her pregnancy."); Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 696
(describing how the UVVA acts to "sever the interests of fetus and pregnant
woman, ultimately furthering an agenda of control over women's bodies and lives").
PREGNANT WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Roe, growing ever distant in the rearview mirror, now appears as
the peak of women's reproductive autonomy, not its
commencement. Fetal rights advocates found the seeds of their
arguments within Roe's holding. 13 Roe established that, because
the state's interest in potential life becomes compelling at twenty-
four weeks, 14 the state's interest will overcome a woman's rights to
privacy and bodily integrity with few exceptions from that point
forward. 15  If the state becomes a watchdog for fetuses and
restricts the behavior of pregnant women, then at some point, this
state intervention challenges the constitutional rights of the
pregnant woman. The question persists: where do we draw the
line between a woman's autonomy and the state's interest in fetal
rights?
This fetal rights trend has far-reaching constitutional and
societal implications, and the legal lines that will be drawn may
not parallel the moral lines that popular opinion prefers. Though
moral issues are critical to this question, this Article's focus is
limited to the constitutional concerns. Part I of this Article
examines the basis for maternal and fetal rights in the United
States. Part II documents the steady increase in according rights
to fetuses and the resulting reduction of pregnant women's rights.
Part III explores how this increase in fetal rights constitutes an
infringement on pregnant women's equal protection rights.
Finally, Part IV argues that a concurrent violation of pregnant
women's right to privacy also occurs. The Article concludes that,
in light of constitutional protections and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of Title VII,16 both the prosecution of and the
involuntary commitment of pregnant women for substance use is a
violation of their rights and must not be sustained.
13. See Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women's
Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro
Fertilization, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 91 (2005) (referencing "Roe's
failure to clearly define what rights to personhood a fetus may hold" as the
instigating factor for much of the increase in demand for fetal rights, which has
"allowed states to undermine the Supreme Court's holding").
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 ("For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion .... ").
15. Id. at 165 (citing an exception to the exercise of the State's interest "where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother").
16. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
2008]
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I. The State of Maternal and Fetal Rights Before 1984
Historically, pregnancy fell into the private sphere and went
unregulated by the state. 17 Laws regulating abortion were the
exception to this standard, and eventually became the flash point
for the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s.18 The
language of "choice," which developed to describe individual
control over reproduction in the movement to legalize abortion,
prompted a backlash centered on the fetus as an individual with
rights.19 The notion of fetal rights that originated in the right-to-
life movement expanded beyond the issue of abortion to include
wrongful death claims, 20 prosecutions for child abuse21 and
17. Roe notes that abortion was not regulated by the common law until
England restricted the practice in 1803. Roe, 410 U.S. at 136 ("England's first
criminal abortion statute . . . came in 1803."). See generally CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 99-102 (1987)
(describing the segregation between public and private spheres and the level of
state regulation that corresponded to each sphere).
18. See, e.g., SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS 221-22 (1979) (describing the
increased influence of the women's movement and its effect on legalizing abortion).
19. See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 241-42 (rev. ed. 2000) (discussing
the formation of "right-to-life" committees in the 1970s to work against the
legalization of abortion). The discussion of choice in pregnancy prompts a diverse
reaction from feminist commentators. Compare MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 125 (1995) ("Single motherhood as a social phenomenon should be
viewed by feminists as a practice resistive to patriarchal ideology, particularly
because it represents a 'deliberate choice' in a world with birth control and
abortion."), and Nancy D. Campbell, The Construction of Pregnant Drug- Using
Women as Criminal Perpetrators, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 463, 476 (2006) ("Once the
mother has made the choice to have a child, she must accept the consequence of
that choice. One of the consequences of having children is that it creates certain
duties and obligations to that child. If a woman does not fulfill those obligations,
then the state must step in to prevent harm to the child." (quoting Nova D.
Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs During
Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 762 (2000))), with Lisa Eckenwiler, Why Not
Retribution? The Particularized Imagination and Justice for Pregnant Addicts, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 91 (2004) ("Freedom, or free agency, is a precondition for
responsibility, and keen attention to the particulars of these women's lives reveals
that freedom is not a fully realized ideal."), Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 267 (1992) ("Social forces define the circumstances under
which a woman conceives a child, including how voluntary her participation in
intercourse may be. Social forces determine whether a woman has access to
methods of preventing and terminating a pregnancy, and whether it is acceptable
for her to use them."), and Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 702-03 (assessing
"wanted" pregnancies). Note also that the term "choice" is not always the best term
when referring to substance use either. For more on addiction, see Paltrow, supra
note 1, at 9-10.
20. See, e.g., M. Todd Parker, A Changing of the Guard: The Propriety of
Appointing Guardians for Fetuses, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1419, 1427 (2004)
(discussing the inclusion of fetal wrongful death claims within a Missouri statute).
[Vol. 26:171
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murder, 22 and the demand for the legislative establishment of
independent fetal rights. 23 This regulation of pregnancy using
fetal rights sprang from the decriminalization and ensuing
regulation of pregnancy termination. 24
In the criminal context, the legal idea of separating a fetus
from the woman who carries it has only developed in the past
quarter century. 25 Over one hundred years ago, Oliver Wendell
Holmes declined to extend personhood to an unborn child, noting
that "the unborn child [i]s a part of the mother . . "26 Recently,
however, a fetal rights advocate called for courts to "allow a fetus
to recover for injuries resulting from the mother's abuse of drugs,
or negligent use of drugs while pregnant."27 Not only have fetal
rights advocates separated the fetus from the woman, but some
have also cast the woman and fetus as courtroom adversaries.
This conceptualization of pregnancy, though new, is not an
21. See Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 250.
22. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 696 ('Thirty-one states currently have
laws against fetal homicide ...."); see also Shannon M. McQueeney, Recognizing
Unborn Victims over Heightening Punishment for Crimes Against Pregnant Women,
31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 461 (2005) (describing California's
fetal homicide statute).
23. See, e.g., Michelle Haynes, Inner Turmoil: Redefining the Individual and
the Conflict of Rights Between Woman and Fetus Created by the Prenatal Protection
Act, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2004) (describing the Texas
Legislature's drafting of a fetal rights bill). Minnesota statutes also reflect this
objective as well; fetal rights advocates have inserted definitions of a fetus (at all
stages of development) as a human into legislation. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.343
(2006) ("[F]etus means any individual human organism from fertilization until
birth.").
24. See Parker, supra note 20, at 1446 ("It was not until efforts in the mid-
twentieth century to reform and liberalize abortion laws that there was a
widespread focus in America on the fetus as a distinct life as the justification for
opposing abortion.").
25. See McLennan Brown, supra note 13, at 90-91 ("Historically, the fetus only
acquired legal rights separate from those of the woman at birth."); see also infra
Part II (discussing State v. Horne, the first criminal fetal rights case). Fetuses
were given independent legal status in the context of wrongful death tort recovery
in 1946. See Elizabeth A. Ackmann, Prenatal Testing Gone Awry: The Birth of a
Conflict of Ethics and Liability, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 199, 203 (2005) (noting that
Bonbrest v. Kotz was "the first case to allow recovery for a fetal injury if the fetus
attained viability").
26. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884); see also
Parker, supra note 20, at 1426 (discussing Holmes' views on the unborn, including
that the fetus lacked standing in courts).
27. Moses Cook, From Conception Until Birth: Exploring the Maternal Duty to
Protect Fetal Health, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1339 (2002); see Tuerkheimer, supra
note 7, at 688 (describing the "notion of fetal personhood" as 'not merely
acceptable' but 'increasingly ... unchallengeable"' (quoting Reva Siegel, Reasoning
from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of
Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 330 (1992))).
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improvement for women because it restricts their rights based
upon the condition of pregnancy. 28
A. The Legal Separation of Woman and Fetus
Infringement on a pregnant woman's rights pits a pregnant
woman against her fetus, the being to which she is most
connected. 29 This gives rise to a painfully personal constitutional
dilemma: if a legal separation of the fetus's interest from the
woman's is forced, whose rights take priority?
Legislatures and courts have determined that the state's
interest in potential life allows the state to declare a woman with
drug addiction unfit to parent.30 Some states, like Minnesota,
have determined that evidence of drug or alcohol abuse during
pregnancy can activate the state's interest and allow the state to
civilly commit a pregnant woman in order to keep her from
"abusing" her fetus. 31 However, policy makers have failed to
consider or address the duty of the state to protect a fetus when a
woman engages in legal activity that also harms a fetus. Such
activities include tobacco use, participation in a dangerous sport,
or ingestion of necessary prescription drugs that are potentially
harmful to the fetus, such as Depakote or Haldol. 32 This selective
and haphazard protection of fetuses weakens the pregnant
woman's authority over her own body and further separates the
pregnant woman from her fetus conceptually.
Feminist scholars struggle with this issue.33 The equality
feminist's vision for change-focused on women's rights-differs
28. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 688 ("Where before the pregnant woman
was regulable, we will see that she now has become invisible.").
29. See generally id. at 704 ("Pregnancy, for many women, is experienced as a
time of growing connection to the developing fetus.").
30. See Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 250.
31. See id. at 249; see also Michelle D. Mills, Fetal Abuse Prosecutions: The
Triumph of Reaction over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 997 (1998) (describing
MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (2006) as applying to use of any controlled substance).
32. Interview with Christie Sandstad, Clinical Nurse Specialist, Psychiatry
Associates (Dec. 16, 2006) (on file with author) (calling prescription medication
such as Lithium Carbonate, Depakote, and Haldol "necessary but risky in
pregnancy'); see also Mills, supra note 31, at 1001-02 (describing the toxic effects of
lawful substances on fetal health, including alcohol, tobacco, and prescription and
over-the-counter medications, as well as potentially harmful activities such as
heavy exercise or high-stress employment); id. at 1027 (describing how the South
Carolina statute in Whitner v. State, 492 S.E. 2d 777 (1997), "could be interpreted
to require mothers to refrain from all activities that are even potentially harmful to
their [fetuses]").
33. See infra Part IV.B (discussing feminist views).
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from the woman-as-mother primacy of relational feminists. 34 The
resulting patchwork of scholarship offers a viable alternative
conceptualization of the maternal-fetal relationship that refuses to
view the pregnant woman and the fetus as having independent
interests. 3
B. In the Beginning, There Was Roe
In the years between 1821 and 1973, every state devised laws
to prohibit or restrict abortion. 36  When the Supreme Court
handed down Roe v. Wade37 in 1973, only a few states had begun
eliminating some of the previously imposed impediments to the
practice. 38 Thus, the recognition of a constitutional right to pre-
viability abortion in Roe represented a dramatic departure from
the existing widespread prohibitions. Roe solidified a right to
personal privacy first identified in Griswold v. Connecticut.39 In
Griswold, the Court located the origin of the right to privacy in the
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. 40 Though Roe appeared to be a
pronouncement of substantial rights afforded to a woman in
making her pregnancy-related decisions, it also created a
framework for state intervention during the latter part of a
woman's pregnancy. 41 The Court balanced a woman's right to
personal privacy against the state's "important and legitimate
interest[s]," which included "protecting the potentiality of human
34. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 669 (describing the incompleteness and
incompatibility of "reproductive autonomy" feminism and "connection" feminism);
see also McLennan Brown, supra note 13, at 89-90 (defining relational feminists as
those who focus on interconnectedness and mutual responsibility, but noting that
"relational feminists believe that women and men approach the world differently,
which may result in a greater allocation of reproductive rights to the woman based
on her unique experiences").
35. See infra Part IV.A.
36. See generally PETCHESKY, supra note 19, at 67-137 (discussing state
criminalization of abortion in the nineteenth century and state legalization of
abortion in the twentieth century, culminating with the "relegalization of abortion
by the Supreme Court in 1973"). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138 (1973), notes that
Connecticut passed the first statute, and only prohibited late term (after
"quickening") terminations.
37. 410 U.S. 113.
38. See PETCHESKY, supra note 19, at 124 (describing how, by 1969, ten states
had lessened or abolished their abortion statutes).
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
40. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
41. See Parker, supra note 20, at 1448 ("Roe began the balancing act between
the woman and the fetus."). For an alternative view of Roe, see MACKINNON, supra
note 17, at 100 ("Roe v. Wade presumes that government nonintervention into the
private sphere promotes a woman's freedom of choice. When the alternative is jail,
there is much to be said for this argument.").
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life." 42 Roe determined that a state's interest became compelling
upon "viability," the point at which a fetus "presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." 43
Therefore, a state could prevent a woman from terminating her
pregnancy in the third trimester, provided it included a health
exception. 44  Though Roe solely addressed the termination of
pregnancy, its declaration of a compelling state interest in
protecting potential life logically extends to other behaviors that
affect fetal health. It was that compelling state interest that
fueled the movement for fetal rights and established a mechanism
by which states can intervene in a woman's pregnancy on behalf of
the fetus. 45
II. The Progressive Reduction in Pregnant Women's Rights
Opponents of Roe were initially successful at the state level
in chipping away at pregnant women's rights. Based on the idea
of protecting the unborn, the right-to-life movement has also
experienced slow but steady success on a federal level, culminating
in the Supreme Court's 2007 endorsement of an abortion
restriction without a health exception. 46
A. State-by-State Attempts to Prosecute Pregnant Women
Became Progressively More Successful
In the aftermath of Roe, the South Carolina Supreme Court
took the next step when it advanced fetal rights in the 1984 case of
State v. Horne.47 The court reversed a manslaughter conviction of
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; see also Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and
Childbirth Choice: Recognizing Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy
Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L.J. 849, 862 (2005) (noting how this balancing focused on
"when the baby becomes an individual," which now creates legal issues for abortion
rights and maternal rights generally).
043. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; see Spiezer, supra note 12, at 510-11 (describing how
the state's interest "at some point may outweigh the individual woman's privacy
interest"). Note that the actual time of viability has changed from Roe to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and it may continue to occur earlier and
earlier in the pregnancy as medicine advances. Ackmann, supra note 25, at 207.
As a result, the amount of pregnancy over which a state has a compelling interest
grows.
44. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65.
45. See Cohen, supra note 42, at 862 ('The result [of Roe] is that today, the
abortion struggle in our society is now waged almost exclusively with reference to
this legalistic question of when the baby becomes an individual."); see also Mills,
supra note 31, at 990-91 (noting that, between 1980 and 1998, "more than 200
women in over 30 jurisdictions [had] been prosecuted for ingesting drugs while
pregnant").
46. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
47. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
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a man accused of stabbing his pregnant wife because it found the
relevant infanticide statute had never been applied to fetuses that
had not been born alive. 48  Changing course, the court then
reinterpreted the law and found an "unborn child' to be a "person"
within the criminal code so that the next defendant would have
sufficient legal notice and could be convicted under the statute. 49
The court reasoned that, because civil wrongful death actions
included the unborn within the definition of "person," the state
criminal statutes should logically follow the same definition to
maintain consistency. 50 Horne began the trend of including an
unborn fetus (sometimes only after viability) within the definition
of a person and inspired other prosecutions around the country.
Though appellate courts often reversed convictions, 51 some
allowed the establishment and extension of fetal rights. 52
In 1986, Louisiana extended rights to pre-embryos created in
vitro. 53  The state statutorily recognizes a pre-implantation
embryo as a "juridical person"54 and "a biological human being." 55
Though the statute was limited to embryos produced for in vitro
fertilization, 56 the Louisiana Legislature created a precedent for
allocating legal rights to the unborn.
In other states, prosecutors in the late 1980s and early 1990s
brought charges against pregnant women under the influence of
drugs or alcohol in an effort to expand the definitions of "person"
in criminal statutes. Illinois prosecutors charged Melanie Green
with manslaughter in 1989 following the death of her newborn,
accusing her of exposing the fetus to cocaine. 57 In 1990, Diane
Pfannenstiel went to a Wisconsin hospital for treatment of injuries
sustained as a victim of domestic violence; she was four months
48. Id. at 704 ("[Alt the time of the stabbing, no South Carolina decision had
held that killing of a viable human being in utero could constitute a criminal
homicide.").
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Dana Page, The Homicide by Child Abuse Conviction of Regina
McKnight, 46 HOw. L.J. 363, 382-83 (2003) (discussing the court's reasoning in
Horne). Beyond wrongful death actions, some states have also granted rights to
fetuses in a "mental anguish common-law cause of action." McLennan Brown,
supra note 13, at 93.
51. See, e.g., infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
52. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 469 (citing examples of courts upholding
women's convictions).
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2006).
54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124.
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126.
56. § 9:121.




pregnant at the time. 58  The government prosecuted Ms.
Pfannenstiel for felony child abuse because she had an elevated
blood alcohol level.59 That same year, Margaret Velasquez Reyes
was charged with felony child endangerment because of her heroin
use during pregnancy. 60 Though the California Court of Appeals
vacated the conviction, 61 Ms. Velasquez Reyes's prosecution in a
state known for progressive action in this area of the law 62
illustrates the breadth of these actions across the country.
Florida took a different tack in 1992: instead of trying to
expand the definition of child, it focused on the moment of birth.63
A state court convicted Jennifer Johnson of delivery of a controlled
substance to her newborn child-through its umbilical cord
immediately following delivery.64 Though overturned by the
Florida Supreme Court, 65 this decision illustrates the increasing
creativity of prosecutors in pursuing pregnant women and the
efforts to construe old laws in new ways without having to enact
updated laws. 66 By 1992, over 150 women had been criminally
prosecuted "because of their behavior during pregnancy."67
Arizona examined the status of the legal rights of an unborn
fetus in the 1992 case Vo v. Superior Court.68 Though the court
declined to extend rights to fetuses in the criminal context, it
encouraged the legislature to do just that.69 At the same time,
58. Id. at 997.
59. Id. at 996; see also Associated Press, Pregnant Woman Is Charged with
Child Abuse for Drinking, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1990, at B8.
60. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977). For more on
the war on drugs, see Page, supra note 50, at 370-76 and Brody & McMillin, supra
note 4, at 248.
61. Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915 (finding that the statute had not and would not
encompass a fetus within the definition of child).
62. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, § 5 (allowing stem cell research which
destroys surplus embryos obtained from in vitro fertilization treatment centers).
63. Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]n infant
at birth is a person .... "), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
64. Id. at 419.
65. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
66. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 466 (noting the use of "existing child abuse
and neglect statutes" and other creative prosecutorial techniques).
67. Page, supra note 50, at 372 (quoting LYNN M. PALTROW, CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN: NATIONAL UPDATE AND OVERVIEW
(1992), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/1992stat.htm).
68. 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). For a discussion of Vo, see Kristi
Kleiboeker, Encouraging Responsibility During Pregnancy Through Amending the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1621, 1626 (2005).
69. Vo, 836 P.2d at 415 ("[W]e agree with commentators that perhaps the time
has come to reexamine the protections afforded unborn children under Arizona's
criminal law .. "); see also Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1627 n.35 (quoting Vo).
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Arizona was willing to prosecute those who harmed a fetus that
was later born alive. 70 This "born alive" rule is a middle ground in
fetal rights-a cause of action only arises if the fetus is
subsequently born alive, as only a live person can enforce legal
rights.71
Oklahoma bestowed "upon viable human fetuses the legal
status of 'human being' under [state] law" in Hughes v. State in
1994.72 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined
that, because the legislature had enacted the homicide statute to
protect human life, expanding this protection to viable fetuses was
consistent with the legislative intent. 73 Thus, the court saw viable
fetuses as human life.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held a fetus to be a person in
a 1995 Child in Need of Protective Services ("CHIPS") action. 74 In
Stdte ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, the lower courts determined
that Angela's fetus could be detained against her will, while in her
womb, in order to protect it from Angela's drug use. 75
By treating the unborn as fully human and punishing women
for certain behavior while pregnant, these state-by-state
prosecutions establish the basis for a more consistent and
successful punishment of pregnant woman. Additionally, the
rhetoric that developed out of concern for fetal life contributed to
the legal view of these women as guardians of fetuses rather than
simply persons who happen to be pregnant.
B. No More Notice: Whitner v. State Sets the Stage for
Successful Convictions and Legislative Action
In 1997, South Carolina charged Cornelia Whitner with
felony child endangerment. 76 Whitner used crack cocaine during
pregnancy, and her child tested positive for cocaine at birth.77
According to the court, "a viable fetus was within the 'plain
70. See Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1628 (discussing Arizona's adherence to
the "horn alive" rule).
71. Id. at 1623. The "born alive" rule has its own flaws; there is a logical
disconnect between punishing women whose activities produce birth defects and
not punishing those women whose conduct contributes to miscarriage or stillbirth.
72. 868 P.2d 730, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
73. Id. at 732-33; see also McQueeney, supra note 22, at 468.
74. State ex. rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 497 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995), rev'd, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997).
75. Id.
76. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). See Page, supra note 50, at
387 for a discussion of Whitner.
77. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79.
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meaning' of the word 'person' in the statute . *7... 78 As one
commentator notes, Whitner was a departure from Horne79 in that
the court did not apply the statute prospectively after making an
interpretation.8 0  Rather, the Whitner court found that the
relevant statute had applied to fetuses all along, meaning the
court could convict Ms. Whitner.8 ' In the thirteen years between
Horne and Whitner, fetal personhood developed from a
consideration that a fetus might be a person within the meaning of
a statute to the presumption that a fetus is a person in some
jurisdictions.8 2
The Missouri Court of Appeals made a similar decision in
1997, when it held "an unborn child [to be] a 'person' for the
purposes of the first-degree murder statute."8 3 The court based
the decision in State v. Holcomb84 on the Missouri Legislature's
passage of an "unborn child statute."8 The court interpreted the
statute to have established that "an unborn child is a person to the
full extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States."8 6
In 2001, the South Carolina Supreme Court prosecuted
another woman for crimes during pregnancy. In State v.
McKnight, the court reviewed and upheld Regina McKnight's
conviction of homicide by child abuse when she delivered a
stillborn child who subsequently tested positive for cocaine.8 7 In
addition to denying procedural defenses, the state supreme court
rejected McKnight's constitutional arguments regarding notice
and privacy.8 8 Citing Whitner, the McKnight court stated: "As to
her own right to privacy, this Court specifically rejected the claim
78. Id. at 780.
79. State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); see supra text accompanying
notes 47-50 (discussing Horne).
80. Page, supra note 50, at 388.
81. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 781 ("[Tjhe legislature intended to include viable
fetuses within the scope of the Code's protection.").
82. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of Whitner. 523 U.S.
1145 (1998).
83. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1632.
84. 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1632.
86. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 291. But see infra note 174 and accompanying text
(discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
87. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d. 168, 171, 179 (S.C. 2001); see Page, supra
note 50, at 363 (detailing the prosecution of McKnight). Page quotes Dorothy E.
Roberts's description of McKnight's prosecution as "part of an alarming trend
towards greater intervention into the lives of pregnant women under the rationale
of protecting the fetus from harm." Id. (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1991)).
88. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 175-76.
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that prosecution for abuse and neglect of a viable fetus due to the
mother's ingestion of cocaine violates any fundamental right."8 9
The court framed the privacy argument in terms of whether or not
smoking crack while pregnant was a constitutional right.90
Texas joined the ranks of states granting rights to fetuses in
2003, when it established a definition of "person" that included the
fetus. 91 The Arkansas Legislature enacted the Fetal Protection
Act and determined that a fetus gestating for over twelve weeks is
a person. 92 Missouri and Louisiana also define a fetus as a
person-effective from the moment of conception. 93
In 2004, the Kentucky Supreme Court followed the lead of
South Carolina, Missouri, Texas, and others. Kentucky previously
adhered to the "born alive" rule. The Court declared a fetus to be
a "person" within the homicide statute and the penal code at
large. 94
Utah prosecuted Melissa Rowland in 2004 after she gave
birth to twins, one of whom was stillborn and the other addicted to
cocaine. 95 Utah's relevant homicide statute specifically includes
fetuses and does not provide an exception for the conduct of the
pregnant woman. 96 The prosecutor called the combination of
Rowland's drug use and refusal to submit to medical procedures
"depraved indifference to human life."97 Though the charges were
dropped "due to Rowland's mental state," Utah was intent on
89. Id. at 176 (citing Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997)).
90. Id. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of McKnight. 540
U.S. 819 (2003).
91. See Haynes, supra note 23, at 132 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.07(a)(26), (38) (Vernon Supp. 2006)). Haynes argues that Texas's Prenatal
Protection Act is insufficient because it does not provide a means to prosecute a
woman whose fetus is harmed by the pregnant woman's commitment of "an
assaultive or intoxicated crime." Id. at 133.
92. McQueeney, supra note 22, at 468 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
102(13)(B)(i)(b) (Supp. 2007)).
93. McLennan Brown, supra note 13, at 92 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7)
(2007) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000)).
94. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1631 (citing Commonwealth v. Morris, 142
S.W.3d 654, 660 (Ky. 2004)).
95. Id. at 1642 (citing Katha Pollitt, Pregnant and Dangerous, THE NATION,
Apr. 26, 2004, at 9).
96. Id. at 1643 n.155 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (2003)). But see infra
notes text accompanying notes 108-10 (discussing the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act (UVVA) of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006), which specifically excludes the
conduct of the pregnant woman).
97. Id. at 1643 (quoting Alexandria Sage, Mom Arrested After Utah Stillbirth,
CBS NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/
12/health/main606119.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2007)). The issue of forcing
pregnant women to undergo medical procedures is another aspect of this movement
for fetal rights. For more information, see Parker, supra note 20, at 1439-44.
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defending the rights of Rowland's fetus. 98
Notably, the Fifth District Court of Appeals for the State of
Florida declined to join the movement of including fetuses within
the definition of "people."99  In a special concurrence, one judge
stated: "If we recognize a fetus as a person, we must accept that
the unborn would have the rights guaranteed persons under the
Constitutiona of the United States .... [I]t would be dangerous to
do so when the potential for state intrusion into the lives of women
is so significant." 100
A report of Kari Parsons's 2005 arrest in Maryland details
the negative consequences of prosecuting pregnant women. 101 Not
only was Parsons arrested because of drug use, but she was
"imprisoned specifically to protect the health of her fetus."'1 2 This
was not the standard practice for Parsons's offense, nor did it
improve the health of the fetus. 103
Following the experimental period of individual prosecutions,
states began legislatively and judicially defining fetal personhood
on a mass scale. 104 This entrenchment of fetal rights and
maternal obligations provided the groundwork for a more
comprehensive national action to "protect" fetal life.
C. Federal Action: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act
Bolsters Fetal Rights Movement
The states were not alone in their fight for fetal rights; the
federal government also contributed to the erosion of pregnant
women's rights in the interest of promoting fetal rights. In 2001, a
bill was introduced in Congress which, while prohibiting the
execution of pregnant women in order to protect the fetus, defined
98. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1643.
99. Wixtrom v. Dep't of Children and Families (In re Guardianship of J.D.S.),
864 So. 2d 534, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also Cohen, supra note 42, at 863.
100. In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 541 (Orfinger, J., concurring and
concurring specially); see also Cohen, supra note 42, at 863.
101. See Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 2 ("Parsons gave birth to her son alone in
a dirty Maryland jail cell furnished only with a toilet and a bed with no sheets. She
had been in labor for several hours and had countless times pleaded for help and
medical attention. The requests were denied.").
102. Id. (noting that "standard practice is to release people arrested for
probation violations on their own recognizance until their later court dates").
103. Id. ("Parsons gave birth completely alone, without health care or support of
any kind.").
104. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FETAL HOMICIDE (2007)
(noting that thirty-six states have fetal homicide laws defining a fetus as a person
to some degree).
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fetuses as "homo sapiens."10 5  In 2002, the Executive Branch
disseminated a new rule for the federal children's health insurance
program that redefined "child" to include a fetus at all stages of
development.106 When the government cloaked the challenge to
pregnant women's rights in the guise of extending health
insurance to the unborn, few contested the semantics. 107
As in the state model, after establishing fetal personhood, the
federal government's next step was to extend protection to the
unborn under criminal law. On April 1, 2004, President Bush
signed the UVVA into law.1 0 8 This law makes it a federal crime to
harm a fetus-a crime distinct from that for harming pregnant
women. 109 Though the UVVA specifically excludes pregnant
women from possible prosecution, 110 its significance lies in its
recognition of legal protection for fetuses. 1
The potential effects of the UVVA include giving "the fetus
formal status, which has the effect of placing the fetus in
competition against its mother-to-be in the legal and medical
arenas, thereby further forsaking the interests of pregnant
women." 2 Some scholars believe the UVVA was "part of a
strategy to undermine Roe."1 3 Restrictions on abortion, however,
105. Innocent Child Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 1595, 107th Cong. (2001).
106. McLennan Brown, supra note 13, at 97 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 457.10(3) (2006)).
McLennan Brown asserts that the combination of word choice in health insurance
statutes, wrongful death claim revisions, and homicide statutes "do not reflect a
state goal of protecting and preserving the life of a fetus but rather attempt to
define and regulate the behavior of a woman who is experiencing a wanted
pregnancy." Id.
107. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and
Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 128-29 (2003) (stating that many anti-abortion
publicists began making assertions about fetal status).
108. Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA) of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The UVVA was subtitled "Laci and Conner's Law" in recognition of Laci
Peterson, who was murdered in her eighth month of pregnancy. See McQueeney,
supra note 22, at 461 (citing Peterson Timeline, KNTV (Jan. 10, 2003),
http://www.nbcll.com/news/1883355/detail.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007)). The
media discussion of the incident illustrates the cultural perspective on late term
pregnancy: the name to be given to Laci's fetus, had it been born, was "Conner";
however, the discourse on the fetus treated him very much as if he were a person.
See Frank Swertlow, Peterson Trial: Musical Chairs in Court, PEOPLE, Sept. 14,
2004, available at http://www.people.com/people/article/O,,696496,00.html ('The 31-
year-old Peterson is accused of murdering his wife, Laci, and their unborn son,
Conner, on Christmas Eve 2002."). Congress's linguistic choice in so naming the
law was significant. This selection of words affirmed the vision of both Laci and
her fetus as individuals, each with his or her own sets of rights.
112. Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 271-72.
113. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 42, at 862 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
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are just one constraint on pregnant women's conduct that may
result from the granting of rights to fetuses. 114 Attorney and legal
commentator Amy F. Cohen describes how the definition of a fetus
as a person "could also cast serious doubt on the resolution of other
pregnancy issues such as the imposition of liability on pregnant
women for neglecting their health during pregnancy, harming
fetuses through the use of drugs, etc."115
Passage of the UVVA may also function as the turning point
in the trend of prosecuting pregnant women. Back in 1998, one
scholar stated that nearly all of these prosecutions had failed
"because most courts have refused to include a fetus as a 'child'
under the statutes." 116 However, with new federal guidance that
specifically mandates fetuses be included in the definition of
"child,"117 these prosecutions may become more successful and
more common.
D. Adding the "Partial Birth"Abortion Legal Analysis to
the Debate
The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law
prohibiting partial birth abortion in 2000.118 Stenberg v. Carhart
reiterated the requirement of a health exception in all abortion
regulations. 119 That reasoning seemed to be more fragile following
114. Page ironically refers to the prosecution of pregnant women as "judicial
activism." Page, supra note 50, at 364.
115. Cohen, supra note 42, at 862. Other problems with the UVVA are evident.
According to Kleiboeker, Congress considered the fact that homicide is the leading
cause of death for pregnant women as a factor in its enactment of the UVVA.
Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1635. Though this is a compelling reason, the UVVA
itself does nothing to protect pregnant women from being killed. See 18 U.S.C. §
1841. Kleiboeker claims that the UVVA increases the deterrence factor for
harming a pregnant woman. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1636. However, one
might presume that the effectiveness of deterrence between one murder
prosecution (for the woman) and two murder prosecutions is negligible to one
contemplating murder in the first place. Another purpose attributed to these fetal
rights statutes is "to dictate compliance with societal notions of acceptable
maternal conduct." Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 692. Additionally, there is an
exception to the UVVA and similar state statutes for abortion, a nod to the
persistence of the Roe decision. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1841; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
201(13)(B)(ii)(a) (Supp. 2007). Though the discussion of fetal rights in the abortion
debate is beyond the scope of this article, note that a number of commentators see
this exception as only a stop along the way to granting and enforcing fetal rights at
every stage of pregnancy. See, e.g., infra note 138 and accompanying text.
116. Mills, supra note 31, at 991 (discussing People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S. 2d
843 (N.Y. Geneva City Ct. 1992).
117. See supra text accompanying note 106.
118. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
119. 530 U.S. at 934.
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the adoption of the UVVA's definition of a fetus as a person. 120
Conspicuously, the Stenberg decision did not prevent Congress and
President Bush from enacting a federal law that restricts the
manner in which a woman may terminate her pregnancy. 121
By November of 2006, when the Supreme Court heard the
challenge to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act ("PBABA")
of 2003,122 fetal rights had expanded exponentially. 123 The recent
Supreme Court decision of Gonzales v. Carhart confirmed the
Court's conservative 124 path within the reproductive liberties
arena. 125 Gonzales upheld the constitutionality of the PBABA. 126
This restriction on procreative choice-here, a prohibition on a
method to terminate a pregnancy127-was the first time the Court
limited abortion without requiring a health exception. 128 Justice
Ginsburg, in her dissent, emphasized the impact of this decision
on the existing reproductive precedent. "Ultimately, the Court
admits that 'moral concerns' are at work, concerns that could yield
prohibitions on any abortion .... By allowing such concerns to
carry the day and case, overriding fundamental rights, the Court
dishonors our precedent." 129  Asserting her support for a
fundamental right to make procreative choices, Justice Ginsburg
stated, "[i]n candor, the [Partial-Birth Abortion Ban] Act, and the
Court's defense of it, cannot be understood as anything other than
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841. Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas opposed the health exception in Stenberg v. Carhart.
530 U.S. at 957-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 980-1020 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 50 U.S. 833, 898
(1992) (deciding that a wife smoking or drinking while pregnant cannot be
regulated by her husband). If the husband cannot regulate his wife's behavior
during pregnancy, how can the State? In contrast, see Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2006), for a
unanimous demand for a health exception. Another definitive case regarding the
ability of pregnant women to make decisions without the intervention of the state
is In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). There, the judge noted:
"Surely, however, a fetus cannot have rights in this respect superior to those of a
person who has already been born." Id. at 1244.
121. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA) of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531
(2006).
122. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1610 (2007).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
124. Lowercase "c" conservative, as in restricting, rather than enhancing,
individual rights.
125. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court was "differently composed" during the last abortion regulation decision).
126. Id. at 1639 (majority opinion).
127. See id. at 1627 ("[The PBABA] regulates and proscribes ... performing the
intact [Dilation and Evacuation] procedure.").
128. See id. at 1636.
129. Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this
Court ... ,"130 According to Justice Ginsburg, then, the previously
existing fundamental right to make reproductive decisions without
interference from the state is now being retracted. 131
A final question emerges from Gonzales: what framework is
the Court using to assess restrictions on procreation? Ironically,
the Gonzales Court did not base its decision on the risk to a future
child or even the harm to the fetus itself.' 32 The majority drew a
line-banning one particular procedure-which, according to
Justice Ginsburg, "saves no fetus ... "133 Ultimately, however,
the ambiguous "moral concerns" framework for assessing
procreational choices is an open invitation to federal legislation to
protect the unborn. That legislation will indubitably infringe upon
the rights of pregnant women.
Nationally, recognition of fetal rights continues to grow, as
illustrated by the fact that at least twenty states have homicide
laws that identify unborn children at any stage of gestation as
victims, and at least twelve more recognize fetuses as living
persons beyond a certain stage of development.1 34 Additionally,
the scope of rights being granted to fetuses is expanding.' 35
130. Id. at 1653.
131. See id. Compare Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546
U.S. 320 (2006) (unanimously holding that a health exception was required in any
restriction on the right to terminate a pregnancy), with Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1636
(majority opinion) (holding, just one year later in a 5-4 decision, that a health
exception was not necessary, contrary to medical opinion). Justice Ginsburg notes
the change in the make-up of the Court as a contributing factor to the decision. Id.
at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[The Court, differently composed than it was
when we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our
earlier invocations of 'the rule of law' and the 'principles of stare decisis."').
132. See id. at 1639 (majority opinion) ("Respondents have not demonstrated
that the [PBABA] . . . imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion
based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception.").
133. Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1645 (citing State Homicide Laws That
Recognize Unborn Victims, National Right to Life Committee (Sept. 2, 1999)
http://www.nrlc.org/whatsnew/sthomicidelaws.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007)); see
Eckenwiler, supra note 19, at 89 (describing the current status of state and federal
laws as a "patchwork quilt of laws governing pregnant addicts"). But see Ehrlich &
Paltrow, supra note 2 (discussing the Maryland high court's decision to reverse
lower court convictions of pregnant women, ruling that child endangerment laws do
not apply to the unborn).
135. Eckenwiler, supra note 19, at 89 ("[T]he current political climate-
characterized by numerous efforts at the federal and state level to grant
personhood status to the fetus . . . may invite an increase in future prosecutions
and other responses that are punitive in nature." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)));
see also Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 2 (describing how, recently, "pregnant
women have been arrested and jailed" in at least nine states because "pregnant
women can be considered child abusers even before they have given birth").
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Further, state legislatures are passing laws to define fetuses as
people to the fullest extent the Constitution will allow. 136 By
adding abortion exceptions to these statutes, the states assume
they are in compliance with Roe. 137 "The logical conclusion to this
gradual erosion is that states, which continually declare a fetus a
person, will reach a point when fetal personhood is a foregone
conclusion, even in the abortion context." 138  This movement,
though popular in Washington and statehouses across the country,
ultimately violates the Constitution. 139
III. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment Requires the Treatment of Pregnant
Women Be the Same As Non-Pregnant Adults
"[A] State may not use its interest in the potential life of a
pregnancy as justification for suspending a woman's constitutional
rights."140 The Equal Protection Clause protects all people from
unequal treatment that is based upon gender, race, national
identity, age or other immutable factors.141 The Supreme Court
has found that the Equal Protection Clause applies when an
individual in one class has been treated differently than an
individual in another class because of certain classifications. 142
136. See e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) ("[Tlhe laws of this state shall
be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every
stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to the
persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the
United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme
Court ... ").
137. See McLennan Brown, supra note 13, at 91 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 92 ('The movement to recognize a fetus as a person inherently
conflicts with a woman's right to bodily integrity and procreational liberty."); see
Paltrow, supra note 1, at 15 ("It is the firmly held belief of some that a woman
should subordinate her right to control her life when she decides to become
pregnant or does become pregnant. Anything which might possibly harm the
developing fetus should be prohibited .... While such a view is consistent with the
recognition of a fetus having rights which are superior to those of its mother, such
is not and cannot be the law of this state." (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist, 531
N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1988))).
140. Spiezer, supra note 12, at 520; see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. Spiezer also states
that, when the fetus's interest is held superior to the pregnant woman's, "women
are not being fully recognized as 'persons' under the [Clonstitution, but rather are
being relegated to a traditionally feminized role without the full rights of 'persons."'
Spiezer, supra note 12, at 526.
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
142. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that racial
restrictions on the freedom to marry violates the central purpose of the Equal
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The Court applies different levels of review to different
classifications; gender classifications have earned an intermediate
level of scrutiny. 1 43  Intermediate scrutiny requires the
government show its actions are substantially related to an
important governmental interest. 144 Because pregnancy is a
gender classification, the state may not treat pregnant women
differently than non-pregnant adults without showing a
substantial government interest and proving the state action is
substantially related to that interest.
A. Pregnancy as Status: An Equal Protection Challenge to
Prosecution
The Court addressed unequal treatment of pregnant women
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.'45 There, the Court determined
that pregnancy was not a gender-based classification, and thus did
not fit within the framework of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 46 In
response, Congress amended Title VII by adding the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA").'47 This statute declares that
discrimination based upon the status of pregnancy is sex-based
discrimination.' 48 Though the PDA was intended to function in
the employment context,' 49 the fundamental finding of pregnancy
discrimination as a component of gender discrimination may be
extended to other applications, such as the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, courts should
view pregnancy discrimination as analogous to gender
discrimination in determining the level of scrutiny to apply in
their analyses. Restrictions specifically directed toward pregnant
women or disproportionately affecting pregnant women must then
be viewed as suspect and meet the intermediate level of scrutiny
Protection Clause).
143. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
144. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 833 (8th ed. 2004).
145. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
146. Id.; see also Mills, supra note 31, at 1028 (discussing the Court's decision
that rational review should be applied to pregnancy discrimination, finding it was
not discrimination on the basis of sex but rather a biological classification).
147. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)); see H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750 (noting that the bill was
introduced in response to the Court's Gilbert decision).
148. H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749,
4751 (describing the PDA's purpose, to "unmistakably [reaffirm] that sex
discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy").
149. Id. at 4749 (noting the purpose of the PDA to clarify sex discrimination
including "discrimination in employment based on pregnancy").
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applied to gender questions under the Equal Protection Clause. 150
To survive this increased scrutiny, these statutes must serve
an important government interest and be substantially related to
that interest. 151  While the government presumably has an
important interest in protecting a fetus, restrictions on pregnant
women's actions and prosecutions of them are not necessarily
substantially related to the protection of fetuses. 152 Prosecutions
can be more harmful to the fetuses than alternative regulations or
no regulations at all; 15 3 further, many superior methods exist with
which to improve the health of fetuses. 154 As Mills notes, these
"[p]rosecutions may in fact exacerbate the problem they intend to
solve," in effect working against the state's interest, rather than
substantially furthering that interest. 155
B. Equal Protection and the Fundamental Right to Parent
In Troxel v. Granville,156 the Supreme Court stated the state
150. Note that strict scrutiny may apply to questions that are posed under the
Due Process Clause. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 474.
151. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Note that the Court in United
States v. Virginia demanded an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for gender-
based government action. 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
152. See Mills, supra note 31, at 1030 ('The health of newborn babies is indeed
an important governmental objective. The means that the states are using to
achieve that objective, however, are not substantially related to meeting the goal.").
153. See id. at 1037-38 ('[U]sing incarceration as a method of punishing drug-
addicted mothers does not improve the fetus's health .... The conditions in prison
are physically hazardous to both mother and baby.").
154. When government focuses so much attention and so many resources on
prosecuting pregnant women's behavior, it neglects other, arguably more
important, factors that cause damage to babies, such as poverty and domestic
violence. See Spiezer, supra note 12, at 522 ("[E]xposure to drugs in utero is not
the major cause of injury to fetuses; actually, poverty and malnutrition are the
most damaging."); see also Eckenwiler, supra note 19, at 93, 95 (asserting that the
focus on a pregnant woman's "inner life" risks diverting "attention from matters of
social structure, including the policies and practices that make drug addiction more
likely," as well as "divert[ing] attention from the men's participation in
procreation"); Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 2 ("Health risks to ... fetuses and
children . . . can be mitigated through prenatal and continuing medical care and
counseling."); Page, supra note 50, at 364 (noting that the prosecution of pregnant
women "diverts public attention from social ills such as poverty, racism and a
misguided national health policy"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 692 ("Regulating
women in the name of vindicating the rights of fetuses, the law utterly fails to
recognize, much less remedy, the full spectrum of violence that impacts their
lives.").
155. Mills, supra note 31, at 1036.
156. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) ('The Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children."); id. at 68-69 ("Accordingly, so long as a
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no
reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
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may not infringe upon a parent's fundamental right to rear a
child.157 Courts thus implicate a fundamental right when viewing
prosecutions of expectant women through the lens of the right to
parent rather than the status of being pregnant, and must
therefore apply a more intense scrutiny. Legal scholars David C.
Brody and Heidee McMillin assert that "[b]eing dependent on
drugs or alcohol does not necessarily make a woman an unfit
parent."158 They argue that abuse or neglect must be evident in
order to legitimate the separation of mother from child. 159
If one rejects substance dependency as a litmus test for unfit
parenting, then parents with substance dependency cannot be
denied their right to parent without more evidence of
incompetence. Prosecuting and jailing women whose babies are
born with drugs in their systems thus denies women their
fundamental right to parent. This results in an unequal, unjust,
and unconstitutional application of the law.
C. Drug Testing and Equal Protection
Adding consideration of the law surrounding drug testing
into the mix supports the claim that the prosecution of pregnant
women for child endangerment or abuse is unconstitutional. The
apparent inconsistency in the way courts use drug testing bolsters
the argument that such prosecution is barred under the
Constitution. Courts recognize that states cannot administer drug
tests to a woman without her consent; 160 however, the state can
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the
rearing of that parent's children." (citation omitted)). But see id. at 73 ("Because we
rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of [the act] and the application of that
broad unlimited power in this case, we do not consider the primary constitutional
question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process
Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or
potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do
not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right
in the visitation context.").
157. Id.
158. Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 251-52.; see also Cohen, supra note 42,
at 880 ("While the Roe framework is appropriate for early pregnancy, in late
pregnancy the individual right of mother-to-be and developing child cannot, and
should not, be artificially disengaged from each other and balanced by the state,
because the state is not in the best position to accurately balance and assess the
interests involved. Instead, absent a showing of incompetence, a mother-to-be
should be authorized to make joint health decisions for herself and the developing
child, as she would be moments after birth.").
159. Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 266.
160. Id. at 253 (noting that the Supreme Court found this practice to be in




drug screen a newborn without the mother's consent and
subsequently use the results to prosecute the mother. 161
Additionally, some states require mandatory reporting of a
pregnant woman's drug use to social welfare agencies. 162
Mandatory reporting can trigger investigations into parenting and
affect eligibility for economic aid and access to other resources,
thus restricting a new parent's access to important government
programs. 163 Finally, men are not administered drug tests when
their children are born to determine whether or not the father may
be an unfit parent. 164 The violation of equal protection guarantees
occurs when women are treated differently under the law because
they gave birth. This invasion of the child for evidence to use
solely against the mother is inconsistent with the constitutional
values of privacy, bodily integrity, and equal application of the
laws. 165
D. Application of Equal Protection
Consider a direct application of the equal protection
guarantee: the notion that the treatment of pregnant substance
users must be the same as non-pregnant substance users. If the
typical non-pregnant individual accused of being intoxicated is
given either a ride home, a night in the "drunk tank," or a fine, the
state must apply that same consequence to a pregnant woman. 166
If a new father who is suspected of drug use is entitled to an
investigation before removal of the child from his custody, the
161. Spiezer, supra note 12, at 514 (describing how, on remand, the Court of
Appeals in Ferguson v. Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (5th Cir. 2002), limited the
holding and found the testing of newborns to not be in violation of the mother's
Fourth Amendment rights). Spiezer writes, "[b]y allowing the prosecution of
women based on the testing of their babies immediately upon birth, the court
allows an easy way around the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of
women during pregnancy." Id. at 521.
162. Brody & McMillin, supra note 4, at 254.
163. Id.
164. Mills notes that substance use by the father can have a harmful effect on
the fetus. Mills, supra note 31, at 1005. "Before conception, the father's exposure
to toxic chemicals, smoking, and drinking alcohol may lead to fetal defects." Id.
Mills also notes that the father's actions during pregnancy-i.e., physical abuse of
the mother-can affect the fetus as well. Id. The practice of prosecuting only
women-though both parents' consumption of substances can cause harm to the
fetus-is at odds with the idea of equal protection.
165. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 694 (describing how the "codification of
fetal victimhood causes the virtual disappearance of the pregnant woman-her
interests, perspective, and rights").
166. See Eckenwiler, supra note 19, at 91 ("Some evidence shows that judges
have imposed longer sentences on pregnant as opposed to other drug users.").
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mother is entitled to identical due process. 167 The status of a
woman as pregnant does not make her less of a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. She is no less deserving of the equal
protection and application of the law. 168
A statement from the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Whitner is in blatant disagreement with this principle, however.
"If the State wishes to impose additional criminal penalties on
pregnant women ... it may do so."169 Judges' statements such as
this provide evidence of the need for a systemic change to protect
the rights of pregnant women. "[T]he underlying condition that
exposes women to criminal charges, drug addiction, is not itself
criminal behavior but a disease"; it is not an act, but rather a
status.170 It is now a bedrock principle of American criminal law
that status does not provide cause for prosecution.' 7'
E. A Feminist Analysis of the Equal Protection Argument
Equality (or "liberal") feminist writers support such an
application of equal protection, one that requires the state to treat
pregnant women the same as other individuals.172 This equal
protection analysis eliminates the problem of setting the interests
of the fetus against the woman, as this view does not neglect the
fetus's interests because it acknowledges the shared interests of
the pregnant woman and the fetus. Such an analysis also allows
for more appropriate and effective solutions to the problem of
substance abuse during pregnancy than pfosecution permits.
Outside of a Planned Parenthood clinic recently, an anti-
167. See Paltrow, supra note 1, at 13 ("Prosecutors [have] argued that arrest [is]
still justified because evidence of a woman's drug use during pregnancy is
predictive of an inability to parent effectively. But fathers identified as drug users
are not automatically presumed to be incapable of parenting.").
168. See Spiezer, supra note 12, at 507 ("[The Supreme Court must mandate
that laws regulating women's reproductive health and safety clearly and
unequivocally value women as autonomous persons rather than as functions of a
socially defined maternal role."); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 669, 698
(describing how, past and present, "the rhetoric of fetal personhood has been
employed to undermine the legal rights of pregnant women," and that most societal
undermining of women has been because women can become pregnant).
169. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (1997); see Campbell, supra note 19,
at 481.
170. Mills, supra note 31, at 1022-23.
171. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that a
statute that makes the status of being a drug addict illegal is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment).
172. Cf. McLennan Brown, supra note 13, at 89 ("Formal equality theorists posit
that society should treat individuals according to their actual characteristics,
regardless of gender .... ).
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abortion protestor shouted, "[w]hy do you discriminate against
babies?" 173  The protestor, essentially reinterpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving fetuses
rights (to life, to proper care, to the potential for a healthy life)
within the context of abortion, would likely extend her logic to the
situation of substance use as well. That approach ignores,
however, that Roe established that a fetus is not a person within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 174 The recognition of
separate rights in the fetus necessarily diminishes the pregnant
woman's rights, which are guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The idea of one individual's exercise of her or his
rights being allowed to reduce another's guaranteed rights is
anathema to the idea of equal protection.
IV. A Woman's Right to Privacy Is Not Altered by the
Condition of Her Pregnancy
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Supreme Court stated, "[i]t is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter." 175 The Casey decision is one in the
relatively short line of cases that exposed, established, and
enshrined the right of privacy in the U.S. Constitution. 176
Beginning in 1967 with Griswold, the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld an individual's right to privacy, though the
source of the right has shifted from a penumbra of enumerated
rights to, most recently, the Fourteenth Amendment.177 Though
the right to privacy began in the secluded setting of the marital
bedroom, 178 it has been extended to private, sexual activities
generally, between any two consenting adults, 179 regardless of
marital status.18 0 Though the Court has yet to address pregnancy
itself under a framework of privacy, it has reviewed both sexual
intercourse l l and childrearing as such. 182 As pregnancy fits into
173. The author witnessed this incident on December 20, 2006, while
volunteering as a clinic escort at the St. Paul Clinic on Ford Parkway.
174. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
175. 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
176. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
177. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), with Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558.
178. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (considering married couples' rights to
contraception).
179. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
180. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438.
181. See, e.g., id.
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the stage between those protected activities, it logically deserves
the safeguard of privacy. 183
A. Structuring a Privacy Argument Against Prosecution:
Type of Review, Autonomy, and the Common Law
Commentators contest which standard of review should apply
to this privacy issue. One analyst asserts that in all procreation
cases, the Supreme Court has mandated an "undue burden"
assessment. 184  In fact, the "undue burden" standard, which
originated in Casey, has only been applied to the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. Extension of this lower standard of review
(when compared with strict scrutiny for other privacy matters) to
all pregnancy-related decisions would create a class of women
whose rights automatically diminish as they procreate. As the
Constitution does not provide for different levels of personhood,
such a situation cannot be permitted. 185
Another commentator describes two aspects of the right to
privacy: "one is freedom from interference with one's body . . .
[t]he other is freedom to act with one's body, i.e., the right to
exercise autonomous control... ,"186
Personal autonomy goes to the heart of what many Justices
feel is at the root of the privacy right. It is perhaps the most
abstract or philosophical strand of privacy doctrine, as it is
less about the right to do a particular thing as about the right
to be let alone. 187
182. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
183. Mills, supra note 31, at 1022 ("While it has never been explicitly stated by
the Court, it logically follows that if a woman's reproductive privacy right extends
to her decisions about contraception and abortion, that right should also encompass
privacy surrounding her health during the pregnancy as well as the fact of the
pregnancy itself.").
184. Carrie Ann Wozniak, Difficult Problems Call for New Solutions: Are
Guardians Proper for Viable Fetuses of Mentally Incompetent Mothers in State
Custody?, 34 STETSON L. REV. 193, 202-03 (2004).
185. But see id. at 205 ("he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy"
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973))). Lawrence stated it applied a
rational basis analysis but appeared to apply heighted scrutiny when the right to
privacy was assessed there. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. However, the Court's
resistance to extending fundamental rights to "non-traditional" lifestyles could not
be applied to the clearly fundamental right to reproduce and carry a child to term.
186. Cohen, supra note 42, at 870 (quoting Barbara A. McCormick, Childbearing
and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman's Right to Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 692
(1983)).
187. Cohen, supra note 42, at 869; see Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 701
(describing how the idea of bodily integrity "animate[s] an understanding of




This notion undermines the McKnight court's rejection of the
privacy defense-the court only examined the potential for
McKnight's behavior of smoking crack to be covered by the privacy
right, rather than reviewing the actions of the hospital and police
in investigating her actions. 188
The common law reinforces the importance of the privacy
aspect of autonomous control in a declaration quite relevant to
pregnancy: "The common law is quite clear that when the bodily
integrity of one individual is pitted against the needs of another,
there is no duty to sacrifice oneself, even if the harm were minimal
and the benefit to the other great."18 9 Ultimately, our legal system
has decided that there shall be no duty to assist, as reinforced by
Good Samaritan laws. 190 Even assuming the existence of fetal
rights, there is no legal basis for requiring a pregnant woman to
extend herself to protect the fetus. This juncture of bodily
autonomy and privacy rights for a pregnant woman is summed up
by Catherine MacKinnon, who declared that society must expose
"the outrages of . . . forced motherhood." 191 Finally, threats to
women's privacy rights are genuine: even those who support the
purpose of the UVVA note that it fosters challenges to privacy,
especially the privacy guaranteed to the pregnant woman. 192
B. Feminist Perspectives on Privacy Rights and
Prosecutions
Feminists have taken various stances on the right to privacy.
Liberal feminists tend to find the right to privacy, especially in
terms of bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy, as being
essential to equality goals. 193 Others, especially those focused on
188. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d. 168, 171-79 (S.C. 2001).
189. Cohen, supra note 42, at 871.
190. Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959); see Paltrow, supra note 1, at 15 ("A
legal duty to guarantee the mental and physical health of another has never before
been recognized in law."). Amy F. Cohen spells out the potential application of such
laws to pregnant women. Cohen, supra note 42, at 871 ("The alternative adopts a
brutally coercive stance towards pregnant women, viewing them as vessels or
means to an end which may be denied the bodily integrity and self-determination
specific to human dignity."). However, one could attempt the analogy of the fetus
as a tenant to the woman's (landlord's) womb. In that case, a general duty of care
would attach. See Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 531 (N.H. 1973).
191. MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 26.
192. Kleiboeker, supra note 68, at 1647 ("[W]hile the UVVA does not directly
inhibit a woman's privacy, the UVVA is a determinative step to approaching the
line between murder and personal autonomy in an area of law that has long been
gray.").
193. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 99 ('The liberal ideal of the private
... holds that, so long as the public does not interfere, autonomous individuals
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the private-public sphere division, see privacy as a luxury of the
"haves" in society-more of a right earned by power and money
than a right accessible to all.1 94 Catherine MacKinnon noted that
the assumption of privacy's inviolability, "framed as an individual
right, presupposes that the private is not already an arm of the
state."195  This assertion is supported by the fact that many
women, and pregnant women especially, live at the mercy of the
welfare system-and thus the state-for food, shelter, and health
care. Those resources come at a cost to women, and some of that
cost is privacy. 196
At first glance, relational feminists like Martha Fineman
might be viewed as favoring the state's protection of the fetus, as
their feminism strives for healthy interactions between all
members in a society but especially between mother and child. 197
This is not the case. Fineman, in her book The Neutered Mother,
The Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies,
clearly rages against the state's intervention into the mother-child
relationship, even to protect the child. She states, "[riather than
seeking to punish Mother, we should be devising ways to enable
her to provide effective mothering."198
Regardless of the critiques of the practical access to privacy
or the suspected negative aspects of privacy, feminists do agree
that a woman should have autonomous control over her body.
Whether or not feminists frame this autonomous control as a right
to privacy, the right to maintain control of one's person throughout
pregnancy is best situated (constitutionally) within the right to
interact freely and equally.").
194. MacKinnon argues that this luxury is primarily male. Id. at 100.
"Feminism confronts the fact that women have no privacy to lose or to guarantee."
Id.
195. Id.
196. MacKinnon suggests that paying this cost may benefit women. See id. at
102 ("When women are segregated in private, separated from each other, one at a
time, a right to that privacy isolates us at once from each other and from public
recourse. This right to privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women
one at a time. It embodies and reflects the private sphere's existing definition of
womanhood.").
197. McLennan Brown notes that "[rielational feminism is dangerous because it
provides arguments that could be used to support fetal personhood legislation
through the ethic of care and mutual responsibility." McLennan Brown, supra note
13, at 104.
198. Fineman, supra note 19, at 216. Fineman points out that, once a child is
born, a framework of privacy based on the individual is less favorable for the
protection of the family unit. Id. at 185 ("[I]f the individual is the focus of
constitutional concern, it is all too easy for the state to justify increased regulation





Feminist scholars might balk at the framing of this
argument, as it relies substantially on the established system of
jurisprudence to argue against the prosecution of pregnant
women. Legal scholar Lisa Eckenwiler dismisses defense
attorneys' arguments against retribution and against prosecution
for the sake of women and children's health; those arguments
state that prosecution will lead to "slippery slope" regulation of all
maternity behaviors. 199 Instead, Eckenwiler proposes that the
focus be placed on the individual woman-not as a failed mother,
but as a woman facing great challenges with few resources to
assist her. 20 0 Though important on a case-by-case level, this
method does little to prevent the overall transformation of our
legal system into a place that values potential life over existing
life.
C. The Government's Mixed Messages on Pregnant
Women's Rights
Another significant consideration in the jurisprudence
surrounding pregnancy and privacy has been the role of state
influence on a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. The
United States Supreme Court has held that states may encourage
women not to seek abortion as part of the state's interest in the
potential life. 201 Though this places pressure on a woman's right
to privacy in her abortion decision, it has not been considered an
undue burden. 20 2 When placed into this framework, fetal injury
prosecutions cause the opposite result: the government, through
its ability to charge substance-using women with crimes if they
carry their pregnancy to term, subtly encourages addicted women
to terminate their pregnancies. 20 3  Finally, viewing these
prosecutions as an undue burden makes them an unconstitutional
infringement on a woman's right to reproductive privacy. 204
199. Eckenwiler, supra note 19, at 95.
200. Id.
201. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (holding
that a state may enact "legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion").
202. Id.
203. See Mills, supra note 31, at 1025 (describing how fetal protection laws "may
actually encourage women to obtain abortions").
204. Id. at 1026-27 ("[A] drug-addicted mother is faced with the following
options: (1) to go to the doctor and risk criminal charges; (2) to shun the doctor and
risk the fetus's health by not getting prenatal care; or (3) to terminate her
pregnancy. Thus, fear of prosecution not only regulates, but unduly burdens, a
20081
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The movement for fetal rights has reduced a woman's right to
privacy. Through drug testing of newborns, welfare resources
dependent upon clean drug tests, and especially the physical
restraint of pregnant women, this reduction in women's autonomy
violates the right to privacy as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
D. Additional Constitutional Issues in Laws Used to
Prosecute Pregnant Women: Lack of Notice, Vagueness,
Overbreadth, and Underinclusiveness
Both the laws extended to apply in fetal rights cases 205 and
the laws designed with fetal protection in mind 206 suffer from
additional constitutional defects. When a reasonable individual is
unaware that a law would apply to her behavior, there is a lack of
notice. 20 7  Courts that extended statutory breadth without
warning, as was the case in Hughes208 and Whitner,20 9 do not give
sufficient legal notice.210 Commentator Michelle D. Mills notes
that most courts examining fetal harm cases have "determined
that a plain reading of the statutory language shows that they
were not intended to apply to fetal abuse, so no reasonable woman
would be aware that her behavior would subject her to criminal
charges." 211
A vagueness defense might also be employed in some of these
prosecutions. While the UVVA specifically excludes actions of the
pregnant woman, state laws are less specific. A lack of supportive
legislative history, clear language, and previous use of these laws
against pregnant women makes for a shaky conviction. Beyond
the vagueness of to whom the law applies, there may also be
vagueness as to which behaviors are prohibited. Many of these
laws erode the right to abortion by bolstering the fetus's alleged
personhood. 212  They might also be interpreted to prohibit
numerous legal activities. When a statute gives such discretion in
woman's decision whether to keep her baby ... ").
205. See supra notes 49, 73, 74 and 78 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 53, 91, 92, 93 and 108 and accompanying text.
207. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (standing
for the proposition that prosecution is unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a statute "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden").
208. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
209. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
210. See supra notes 73 & 81.
211. Mills, supra note 31, at 1020.
212. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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enforcement, it is void for vagueness. 21 3
The statutes written to prosecute pregnant women for fetal
abuse also suffer from overbreadth. 21 4  An overinclusive law
affects those outside its intended application. 2 15  The lack of
specification of prohibited behaviors leaves many activities
prosecutable. When statutes are phrased to prohibit any action
that may harm a fetus, they cannot be constitutionally enforced.
The overbreadth argument is especially salient as the causal link
between fetal drug exposure and fetal injury is very difficult to
prove scientifically. 216  Therefore, women are not prosecuted
purely because of harm they may have caused to their fetuses, but
because of their drug use. Recall that status prosecution is
unconstitutional under Robinson.217  When prosecutions occur
before delivery, they are based on the assumption that the fetus
was injured, with no evidence to support that conclusion. In fact,
there may be no injury at all.2 18
These overinclusive statutes are simultaneously
underinclusive, by not applying to all behaviors which injure
fetuses. 219 Not only do these laws restrict only certain people's
behavior (sometimes excluding the pregnant woman, generally
excluding physicians), they also frequently only restrict some types
of behavior. Drug use early on in the pregnancy is not
prosecuted, 220 and neither is smoking. 221 On a broad social scale,
213. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
214. Mills, supra note 31, at 1035.
215. See id. at 1033.
216. Id. at 1035 ("The degree of fetal injury, and whether any injury occurs at
all, is the product of a number of factors and cannot be determined solely on the
basis of the mother's ingestion of a controlled substance.").
217. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; see also Mills, supra note 31, at
1025 ("[T]hese statutes seem designed to punish women for drug use rather than
for child abuse.").
218. See Mills, supra note 31, at 1035-36 ("Women who are held liable while
they are pregnant are prosecuted well before any discernable harm is known. ...
Therefore, at least some women who are included in a law's definition of a fetal
abuser have not, in fact, harmed their children.").
219. Id. at 1034.
220. See id. ("[O]nly late-term drug use is prosecuted, but early exposure creates
the most serious risk of fetal injury."). Even if state fetal personhood statutes were
used to prosecute a woman for drug use early in her pregnancy, proof of use would
likely be difficult to obtain. See id. at 1034 n.383 ("If a woman uses drugs early in
pregnancy, tests of the mother or baby at the time of delivery will definitely be
negative.").
221. The South Carolina Attorney General's Office, the same office that
prosecuted Cornelia Whitner, see supra Part IIB, stated that even following that
case, a pregnant woman engaging in legal activities such as smoking cigarettes
would not invite prosecution. Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. (1997), 1997 S.C. AG LEXIS 175,
at *22 ("While obviously Whitner is capable of being read both broadly as well as
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these prosecutions aimed at protecting fetuses do nothing to solve
the most significant problems faced by pregnant women such as
poverty, malnutrition, and lack of health care. 222
Conclusion
The recent movement for supporting fetal rights began as a
response to the allocation of rights to women-the choice to
determine whether to continue their pregnancies. The current
right of women to autonomy during the ongoing pregnancy is being
threatened. At the judicial and legislative levels, and at the state
and federal levels of government, fetal rights advocates are
succeeding in winning rights for fetuses at the expense of women's
rights. The UVVA, by defining a fetus as a person, was the first
step nationally toward pursuing equal rights for these "people."
Though Roe stands in the way of recognizing fetuses as people
under the Fourteenth Amendment, legislators may devise a
distinction between early pregnancy and a third-term fetus, using
Roe's own compelling state interest. However, the enduring rights
of privacy and equal protection demand that pregnant women,
regardless of their reproductive status, have the same rights as
other adults. Therefore, any grant of fetal rights that interferes
with a woman's constitutional rights cannot be tolerated.
narrowly, the Court's insertion of the language regarding a woman having no
privacy right to engage in illegal substance abuse following the motion for
reconsideration leads us to recommend a cautious approach, thereby generally
limiting application of Whitner to a mother's use of illegal substances such as crack
cocaine.").
222. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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